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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim for damages for personal injuries by Plaintiff ("Robinson")
against Defendant Connie Mueller ("Mueller"), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Hazel
Marquardt. Robinson was injured on September 6, 2009, when she fell from a second story deck
on a house owned by Hazel Marquardt ("Marquardf') and rented by Marquardt's tenant, Bryan
Winkelman ("Winkelman"), who is not a party to this action. The deck did not have a protective
railing on its front and sides. Marquardt passed away in the spring of201l.
B. Course of Proceedings Below

Robinson filed her complaint against Marquardt on May 13, 2011. R. pp. 7-10.
Marquardt answered, R. pp. 11-16, and the parties engaged in discovery, hired expert witnesses,
took depositions of various individuals, and prepared for trial.
judgment motion to which Robinson responded.

R. pp. 17-94.

Marquardt filed a summary
The motion was heard on

January 18,2013. The district court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Motion for
Summary Judgment on February 6, 2013. R. pp. 95-102. Judgment was entered on February 12,
2013. R. pp. 103-04. Robinson filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 26,2013. R. pp. 105108.
C. Statement of Facts
Hazel Marquardt and her husband pUrchased a house at 12 Cottonwood Drive in St.
Maries, Idaho, in 1973. R. p. 34. The house has an upper floor apartment with a separate
entrance. R. p. 36. The upper floor apartment has a door that opens onto a flat area bordered on
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two sides by the sloped roof. R. p. 20. The flat area has been referred to in this litigation as part
of the roof (R. p. 79), a deck, (R. pp. 41, 79), a recessed dormer (R. p. 20), a balcony (R. p. 8),
and, in the rental agreement, a patio (R. p. 78). It will be referred in this brief as a deck. The
deck did not have a protective railing surrounding it, despite the fact that it was ten to twelve feet
above the ground. R. p. 21. The outdoor deck area is about seventy-eight square feet, and is 11.5
feet (or 138 inches) wide and 7.56 feet (or 90.75 inches) deep. R. p. 37.
Beginning April 1, 2007, Marquardt rented the upstairs apartment to Bryan Winkelman.
Marquardt lived in the dovmstairs portion of the home. R. pp. 35, 78. The rental agreement did
not require Winkelman to maintain or repair the premises. R. p. 78. Mueller testified that during
Winkelman's tenancy in October 2008, Marquardt replaced the apartment door that led to the
deck because the old door leaked cold air. R. p. 70.

Mueller also testified that Marquardt

replaced the carpet in the upstairs apartment. R. p. 36.
Early in the morning on September 6, 2009, Robinson was a guest of Winkelman at the
apartment he rented from Marquardt.

Once inside the apartment, Winkelman and Robinson

stepped onto the deck so that Winkelman could show Robinson the beautiful view from the deck.
R. p. 39. After going back inside, Winkelman went to his car to retrieve an item and Robinson
picked up her cigarettes and proceeded to the deck to smoke. R. p. 40. She picked up a blanket
from a chair as the night was cool, and walked through the door to the deck. R. p. 40.
As she was walking through the door, she tripped. Robinson believes she tripped on the
blanket although she is not certain. Id. She twisted herself as she fell to the right because she
wanted to sit to stop her fall. She knew the roof was right there and she tried to grasp onto
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something to stop her fall. Id. Robinson is certain that she tripped. She landed on the sloped
roof and slid off the roof to the ground below, causing a fracture of her femur. R. p. 68; see also
R. p. 8. Railing around the deck likely would have prevented her fall, either by providing her

with something to grab onto, or by arresting the momentum of her fall.
Robinson did not notice the lack of railings around the deck when she and Winkelman
stepped onto the deck to look at the view. R. p. 67,68. Marquardt did not warn Robinson about
the lack of railings around the deck, as the first time Robinson spoke with Marquardt was several
months following Robinson's fall. R. p. 69. There were no signs warning that the deck lacked
protective railings. R. p. 97.
Robinson contends that Winkelman did not tell her that the deck lacked a railing. R. p.
69. In a statement given to Marquardt's agent shortly after Robinson's fall, Winkelman said he
did not warn Robinson about the lack of a railing and did not tell her to stay off the deck. R. p.
79. In an affidavit he signed two and one-half years later, he said that he did warn her about the

lack of a railing. R. p. 41-44.
Winkelman's deposition testimony was inconsistent:

R.p.72.

Q.

[By Mr. Haman) Now, you mention that you told Twylla not to go out on
the balcony because there wasn't any deck railing. Why did you tell her
that?

A.

Because I didn't want her to fall off. That's why I opened the door, but I
told her - I said there was no deck railing around there. I didn't want her
to walk out and actually not know that it wasn't there. And she would fall
off. So I just warned her before I went down to go get my gum in my car.

Q.

[By Ms. Meyer] Do you recall giving a statement to a man named Barry
Trent on October 6, 2009?

A.

Yes, I do. I believe I did, yeah.

Q.

Did you understand that the statement was recorded?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever seen a transcript ofthe statement?

A.

No.

Q.

At the time you gave the statement was it your intent to give truthful
answers to the questions that you were asked?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you answer truthfully?

A.

As best as

Q.

. .. Mr. Trent apparently asked you "Did you tell Twylla or warn her
about the deck not having any rails or anyihing of that nature?"
And you answered that "No." Correct?

A.

Yeah. At that time I think, yes.

Q.

And then he also asked you "Did you tell her not to go out there?"
And you indicated that you did not tell her not to go out there, right?

A.

Probably not at that time, no.

Q.

So-

A.

\\'here I said - Yeah. I just - I told her - well, said, you know, it's just the
door that - "This door opens, goes out onto the roof."

possi~}ic,

R. p. 74.
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Q.

But you didn't say "Don't go out there," correct?

A.

Not that I can remember.

Q.

[By Mr. Haman] And as you sit here today your memory is that you told
her not to go out onto that deck, correct?

A.

Yes. I may not have told him when I had an interview with him; but if I
remember right, I thought I told her that. But I probably didn't mention
that to him at that time.

Q.

"Him" being Mr. Trent?

A.

Yes.

Q.

[By Ms. Meyer] I asked you earlier, Bryan, if your intent when you talked
with [Mr.
was 10 tell the truth. And that was your intent, wasn't i1?

A.

It was my intent.

Q.

.And your answers were truthful when you gave them, weren't they?

A.

At the time, yes, that I can remember; yes.

R. p. 75.

R. p. 75.

R. p. 76.

Mr. Winkelman's recorded statement was taken on October 6, 2009, by Barry Trent,

shortly after the fall and nearly three years before Mr. Winkelman's deposition was taken. R. p.
74. Winkelman responded to Mr. Trent's questions about whether Winkelman warned Robinson
as follows:
Did you tell Twyla [sic] or warn her about the deck not having any rails or
anything of that nature?
Q.
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A.

No. Um-

Q.

Did you tell her not to-

A.

1-1-

Q.

Go out there?

A.

Well, I didn't tell her to go - not to go out there -

Q.

Okay.

A.

I just - I just - I told her well - well, I said, you know, it's just - the - the
door - or this door opens up just goes up on a roof. And - and um, but I
didn't say don't go out there, you know-

R.p.79.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the district

(·Otlrt tTl

as a matter of law in failing to recognize that this Court's

ruling in Stephens v. Stearns states the duty of a landlord to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances with respect to the landlord's tenant and the tenant's social guests?
2. Did the district court err as a matter of law in failing to extend the ruling in Stephens
v. Szearns that a landlord's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances runs to the

landlord's tenant's guests?
3. Did the district court err in failing to consider Marquardt's general duty to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances and whether that duty was an additional basis for
liability or a basis for extending a previously defined duty?
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4. Did the district court err in holding that Marquardt did not breach a duty of care to
Robinson and implicitly that Marquardt did not have a duty of care to Robinson?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court's review of a district court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is
the same standard as that employed by the district court in ruling on the motion. Pursuant to
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court must review the "pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits" to determine whether there are
any genuine issues as to any material facts and whether the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). On review, the Supreme Court liberally construes
the record in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and resolves all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in the non-moving party's favor. If reasonable people could reach
differing conclusions or conflicting inferences, the motion should be denied. If the evidence
reveals no genuine issues of material fact, the Supreme Court exercises free review over any
remaining questions oflaw. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 246-47, 985 P.2d 669, 671-72
(1999) (citing Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 887 P .2d 29 (1994), Farm Credit
Bank ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,869 P.2d 1365 (1994)).
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IV. ARGlJMENT
A. The Landlord's Duty to Tenants and Guests of Tenants is to Exercise Reasonable Care
Under the Circumstances.
1. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984), Provides the Applicable

Duty of Care of the Landlord to a Tenant's Guest.
Robinson was a guest of Winkelman at his second story apartment he rented from
Marquardt who ovmed the residence and lived on the lower floor. Winkelman's apartment had a
door that opened onto a deck of seventy-eight square feet. R. p. 37. The deck did not have a
protective railing around it, and when Robinson tripped going out the door onto the deck, she fell
to ground after sliding off the sloped roof surrounding the deck. There is no genuine issue that a
protective railing would have arrested or prevented her fall from the second story. This case thus
concerns injuries to a tenant's guest at a residential rental unit, and accordingly, a legal analysis
of the landlord's (Marquardt's) duty to Robinson begins with Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho
249,678 P.2d 41 (1984). In Stephens. this Court brought to an end the old common law rule of
landlord immunity which provided that a landlord is generally not liable, with certain exceptions,
for injuries caused by defects or dangerous conditions in leased premises. Stephens, 106 Idaho at
257,678 P.2d at 49; Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388,390,308 A.2d 528,530 (1973).
Stephens had rented a two-level townhouse from Steams. The apartment had an interior
stairway without a handrail. One evening more than three years after she began renting the town
house, Stephens had drinks with friends, and when she returned to her apartment, she changed
her clothes upstairs. She then fell down the stairs and was injured. Stephens sued the architect,
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builder and seller of the building, and her landlord. The trial court granted a motion for directed
verdict in the landlord's favor, concluding that under the common law, landlords were not liable
to tenants for damage resulting from dangerous conditions existing at the time the unit was
leased.

106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49. The Supreme Court noted the several exceptions to

the general rule of non-liability, then stated that the Plaintiff had brought to the Court's attention
the modem trend in landlord liability law across the United States that "landlords are simply
under a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court observed that the Tennessee Supreme Court had the foresight
to "grasp this concept" nearly a century earlier when it stated:
"The ground of liability upon the part of a landlord when he demises dangerous
property has nothing special to do with the relation of the landlord and tenant. It
is the ordinmy case of liability for personal misfeasance, which runs through all
the
of individuals to each other. "
t

Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257,678 P.2d at 49 (quoting Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538,46 S.W.

297, 299 (1898) (emphasis added)). The "ordinary case of liability for personal misfeasance"
will be discussed further in section B of this brief.
This Court also relied on Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973), the
seminal case advancing the "modem trend" that landlords must exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances. This Court quoted the following passage from Sargent:
"We thus bring up to date the other half of landlord-tenant law. Henceforth,
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to
an unreasonable risk of harm . . . . A landlord must act as a reasonable person
under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the
risk."
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Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d

528,534 (1973). Significantly, the injury in Sargent was not to a tenant but to a child the tenant
was tending. This is important. Stephens involved an injury to a tenant, but many of the cases
from other jurisdictions relied on by the Idaho Supreme Court involved injuries to tenants'
guests, visitors, and to the tenants themselves.
Discussing the control exception to the landlord non-liability rule, the North Hampshire
court observed:
The anomaly of the general rule of landlord tort immunity and the
inflexibility of the standard exceptions, such as the control exception, is pointedly
demonstrated by this case. A child is killed by a dangerous condition of the
premises. [Tenants] testify that they could do nothing to remedy the defect
because they did not own the house nor have authority to alter the defect. But the
landlord claims that she should not be liable because the stairs were not under her
(;(lfltr,A. Both of these contentions are premised on the theory that the other pa.rty
should be responsible. So the orthodox analysis would leave us with neither
landlord nor tenant responsible for dangerous conditions on the premises. This
would be both illogical and intolerable, particularly since neither party then would
have a legal reason to remedy or take precautionary measures with respect to
dangerous conditions. In fact, the traditional 'control' rule actually discourages a
landlord from remedying a dangerous condition since his repairs may be evidence
of his control. Nor can there be serious doubt that ordinarily the landlord is best
able to remedy dangerous conditions. particular(v where a substantial alteration
is required.
113 N.H. at 393-94,308 A.2d at 532 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Sargent court said that although the dangerous stairs at issue were not a common
stairway or otherwise under the landlord's control, it could nevertheless "strain" to find control
in the landlord. However, the court was not inclined to so "expand the fiction" "since we agree
that 'it is not part of the general law of negligence to exonerate a defendant simply because the
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condition attributable to his negligence has passed beyond his control before it causes injury. '"
113 N.H. at 393, 308 A. 2d at 53l. The court noted that its decision would shift the primary
focus from the usual inquiries concerning who had control to a determination of whether the
landlord and the injured party exercised due care under all the circumstances.
Perhaps even more significantly, the ordinary negligence standard would help
insure that a landlord will take whatever precautions are necessary under the
circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in his property. "It
is appropriate that the landlord who will retain ownership of the premises and any
permanent improvements should bear the cost of repairs necessary to make the
premises safe [.]"
113 N.H. at 399,308 A. 2d at 535 (quoting Kline v, Burns, 111 N.H. 87,92,276 A.2d 248,251
(1971)).
Likewise, this Court in Stephens v, Stearns noted that many courts "'have expended
energy and exercised great ingenuity in attempting

to

lit

f!letHal settings

into the recognized exceptions'" to the rule oflandlord non-liability. 106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d
at 50 (citations omitted).
We believe that the energies of the courts of Idaho should be used in a more
productive manner. Therefore, after examining both the common-law rule and
the modem trend, we today decide to leave the common-law rule and its
exceptions behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances.

ld.
In announcing this rule, the Court allayed fears that landlords would face unfettered
liability:

"We stress that adoption of this rule is not tantamount to making the landlord an
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insurer for all injury occumng on the premises, but merely constitutes our removal of the
landlord's common-law cloak of immunity." Id.
In Stephens, this Court relied on many cases from other jurisdictions including Young v.
Garvvacki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E. 2d 1045 (1980), and PagelsdOlf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979). Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50.

The facts in the Young case are remarkably similar to the facts in the present case.
Garwacki was a tenant of LaFreniere.

Garwacki's roommate, Mastello, invited Young to

Garwacki's and Mastello's second floor apartment for a dinner party. Mastello went down to his
car which was parked near the house. Young went to the elevated front "porch," which was
accessible only from the living room of the second story apartment, to ask Mastello to pick up
some groceries. When she placed her hands on the railing and leaned forward, the railing gave
way, she fell to the ground, and was injured. Young, 380 Mass. at 163,402 N.E. 2d at 1046.
Relying on Sargent v. Ross, among other authority, the court held:
Today, we do away with the ancient law that bars a tenant's guest from
recovering compensation from a landlord for injuries caused by negligent
maintenance of areas rented to the tenant. Like the other rules based on status,
this rule has prevented a whole class of people from raising the overriding issue:
whether the landlord acted reasonably under the circumstances. The practical
result of this archaic rule has been to discourage repairs of rented premises. In
cases like the one before us, a landlord with knowledge of a defect has less
incentive to repair it. And the tenant, who often has a short-term lease, limited
funds, and limited experience dealing with such defects, will not be inclined to
pay for expensive work on a place he will soon be leaving. Thus, the defect may
go unrepaired until an unsuspecting plaintiff finds herself with a lawsuit that care
could have prevented.
380 Mass. at 168-69,402 N.E. 2d at 1049.
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The facts in Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, are also similar to the facts in this
case. In Pagelsdorf, the Blattners rented a second story duplex from the Mahnkes, who lived in
the lower unit. There were front and back balconies on each unit. A neighbor, Pagelsdorf, went
to the Blattners' apartment to help move some heavy furniture. In the process of hoisting some
furniture over the rear balcony railing to the ground, Pagelsdorf leaned against the railing which
came loose. He fell to the ground below, and was injured. 91 Wis. 2d at 735, 284 N.W. 2d at
56.
The Wisconsin court noted that the facts of the case arose prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W. 2d 1 (1975), in which the
distinctions between different duties owed by a possessor of land to a licensee or invitee were
abolished. The parties agreed that the extent of Mahnke's duty to Pagelsdorf turned on whether
Pagelsdorf was an invitee or licensee. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed, however,
noting that the arguments overlooked "the effect on a la.l1do'IA'Iler's common law duty upon
transfer of the premises from the OV\'Iler to a lessee." Under the common law, when property was
leased, the landlord was not liable for injuries to his tenants or their guests resulting from defects
in the premises, unless certain exceptions applied, none of which were applicable to the facts of
the case. Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 739-41,284 N.W. 2d at 558-59.
The court stated:
Therefore, if we were to follow the traditional rule, Pagelsdorf was not entitled to
an instruction that Mahnke owed him a duty of ordinary care. We believe,
however, that the better public policy lies in the abandonment of the general rule
of nonliability and the adoption of a rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise
ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises.
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Id. at 741,284 N.W. 2d at 59.

Relying on Sargent v. Ross, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated the following
concerning the old rule of landlord nonliability: "Whatever justification the rule might once have
had, there no longer seemed to be any reason to except landlords from a general duty of
exercising ordinary care to prevent foreseeable harm." Pagelsd07f, 91 Wis. 2d at 742, 284 N.W.
2d at 59. The court then held:
In Antoniewicz, supra, we cited Sargent as one of many cases whose reasoning
supported the abolition of the common law distinctions between licensees and
invitees. The policies supporting our decision to abandon these distinctions
concerning a land occupier's duty toward his visitors compel us, in the instant
case, to abrogate the landlord's general cloak of immunity toward his tenants and
their visitors. Having recognized that modem social conditions no longer support
special exceptions for land occupiers, it is but a short step to hold that there is no
remaining basis for a general rule of nonliability for landlords. ... One of the
basic principles of our tort law is fhat one is lioh/v
irguries resulting from
conduct foreseeably creating an unreasonable risk to others. Public policy
limitations on the application of this principle are shrinking.
Id. at 743, 284 N.W. 2d at 59-60 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Important principles can be derived from the foregoing. First the old landlord immunity
was comprehensive. Once a landlord demised the premises to a tenant, the landlord had no
liability to the tenant or the tenant's guests for defects in or dangerous conditions on the
premises. Pagelsd07f, 91 Wis. 2d at 740, 284 N. W. 2d at 58; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
356, comment a (1965) (cited by Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 257,678 P.2d at 49). This is
because a lease was generally considered a conveyance of real property with possession and
control being transferred to the lessee as welL Pagelsdorf 91 Wis. 2d at 740, 284 N.W. 2d at 58.
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"This 'quasi-sovereignty of the landowner,'" including immunity from "simple rules of
reasonable conduct which govern other persons" "find its source in an agrarian England of the
dark ages." Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. at 391,308 A. 2d at 530 (citations omitted).
Second, this Court's elimination of the old rule of landlord non-liability was
comprehensive as well: "[W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its exceptions
behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light
of all the circumstances." Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50. Although Stephens v.
Stefulls involved an injury to a tenant, there is nothing in the court's ruling or holding expressly
limiting it to tenants.
Indeed, this Court's reliance on cases involving injuries to guests such as Sargent, Young,
and PagelsdOlf, combined with the very language quoted and employed by this Court in
Stephens lead to the inescapable conclusion that the ruling is not confined only to tenants, but to

tenants' guests as well: "'A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the
circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.'"

Id. (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113

N.H. 388,308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973»).

Third, because this is a case involving residential rental premises, the entrants-on-theland status of licensee and invitee do not apply based on the holding in Stephens v. Stearns. The
concurring opinion in Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988), confirms this. In
that case, a residential tenant's cleaning lady fell down stairs that were narrow and lacked a
handrail. The Court held that because an employee will encounter a known and obvious danger
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to retain employment, the landlord owed the tenant's employee a duty of reasonable care to
provide safe conditions. ld. at 871, 749 P.2d at 490. The concurring opinion provides special
insight into the Court's earlier opimon in Stephens:
In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, we held that the measure of a landlord's
duty is not determined under trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis, but rather, "A
landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including
the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and
the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Id., at 258, 678 P.2d at 50, quoting
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.S. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973). The landlord's duty to
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances extends to his or her
tenant or anyone on the premises with the tenant's consent. Pagelsdor/v. Sa/eco
Ins. Co. o.fAmerica, 91 \Vis.2d 734,284 N,W.2d 55,61 (1973).

Marcher, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and Huntley, JJ., concurring) (emphasis
added).
The Court in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P .2d 1321 (1989), also discussed

Stephens v. Stearns and the Marcher concurrence. In Harrison, this Court noted that "likelihood
of injury to others" is the equivalent of foreseeability and quoted the concurring opinion in

Marcher v. Butler referenced above:
In Marcher v. Butler, supra, two concurring justices recognized the applicability
of the Stephens rule and stated the following:
The trial court's reliance upon the traditional law pertaining to
invitees was misplaced. The test is one of reasonableness under all
the circumstances, not one of hidden or obvious dangers, or
exceptions to the traditional general rule of non-liability for
landlords. As we have said before, there is no justification for the
general cloak of common law immunity for landlords.

ld. at 593-94, 768 P.2d at l326-27 (quoting Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491
(Bistline and Huntley, n., concurring)).
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Plaintiff contends that Marquardt's actions in maintaining the upper floor apartment at 12
Cottonwood Drive without a protective railing around the flat deck area violated her duties of
reasonable care to Robinson. In other words she did not '" act as a reasonable person under all of
the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.'"

Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at

258,678 P.2d at 50, (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973)). When
a second story apartment has a deck accessed by an interior door and the deck is not protected by
a railing, the likelihood of injury to others is increased, and not only that; injury is foreseeable.
The probable seriousness of injuries to those who fall more than ten feet to the ground below is
high, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk is relatively small. In addition, a tenant of a
residential rental unit is generally not in a position to remedy the dangerous condition because he
may not be authorized to undertake repairing or altering the premises, Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H.
at 393-94, 308 A.2d at 532, and he "often has a short-term lease, limited funds, and limited
experience dealing with such defects" and thus "will not be inclined to pay for expensive work
on a place he will soon be leaving." Young v. Garyvacki, 380 Mass. at 168-69, 402 N.E. 2d at
1049.
Although Stephens v. Stearns established that the landlord's common-law cloak of
immunity was abolished, Defendant maintains that Stephens applies only to a landlord's duty to
its tenants. As between the landlord and a tenant's guests, Defendant contends that the landlord
is to be considered a mere owner of land and the entrants-on-the-Iand paradigm applies. That
would mean that liability of the landlord for injuries to the tenant is analyzed under a completely
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different legal theory than the liability of the landlord for injuries to the tenant's guest. The facts
of this case illustrate the absurd results that would follow: If the tenant, Winkelman, had fallen
from the deck, the issue would have been whether Marquardt had acted reasonably under all the
circumstances in maintaining a deck without a protective railing.

Yet, with respect to the

tenant's guests, according to the Defendant, the landlord would only have a duty, if at all, to
warn the tenant of the dangerous condition.
Another reason this case should not be analyzed under the entrants-on-the-Iand paradigm,
is that Marquardt leased the apartment, and she should remain in her role as a landlord, rather
than be converted to a mere owner/occupier of land if there is an injury to her tenant's guest.
Moreover, The Defendant and the district court are incorrect in applying the entrants-on-the-Iand
theory in this case. If the Stephens rule does not apply to tenant's guests, Marquardt would have
no duty to Robinson-not even a duty to warn-under the old landlord immunity law. It is
difficult to imagine that this Court, joining the modem trend in 1984 in "leaving behind" the
antiquated law of landlord non-liability, intended to leave social guests of tenants without even
the ordinary negligence protection that people are owed from other people to refrain from
conduct resulting in unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm.
2. Alternatively, The Landlord's Duty of Reasonable Care Announced in Stephens
v. Stearns Should be Extended to a Landlord's Tenant's Guests.

If the Court determines that Stephens announced the elimination of the landlord cloak of
immunity only with respect to tenants, Robinson urges the Court to continue in Idaho the modern
trend in extending the landlord's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to guests of
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tenants. There is no good reason to avoid doing this. The duty urged is an ordinary negligence
duty of reasonable care; it is not a duty of extraordinary care or strict liability. It is the general
duty every person has in ordering his or her conduct so as to avoid exposing others to a
foreseeable, unreasonable risk of hann.
B. Everv Person has a General Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care.
As a general rule "each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable
risks ofharrn to others." Shalp v.

w.H. Moore,

118 Idaho 297,796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990). This

was stated by the Court as an additional reason for finding the existence of a duty of care in

ShGlp.
The Court stated further that "[w]hether the duty attaches is largely a question for the
trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the risk," and that "[fJoreseeability is a flexible concept
which varies with the circumstances of each case." Id. at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. "Vlhere the
degree of result or hann is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of
foreseeability is required." Id. at 300,796 P.2d at 509-10.
Sharp was an employee of Swan Insurance Agency which rented space in a building
owned by W.H. Moore, Inc. W.H. Moore contracted with Security Investment to manage the
building and Security Investment hired Security Police to provide patrols. Id. at 298, 796 P.2d at
507. Sharp was working alone in her office on a Sunday morning when she was assaulted and
raped by an intruder. The intruder may have gained access through a unlocked third floor fire
escape door and into the office through the unlocked office door. !d. The defendants (W.H.
Moore, Security Investments and Security Police) filed a summary judgment motion, which was
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granted. In reversing, this Court noted that the Court in Stephens v. Stearns determined that a
landlord owes a tenant a duty of reasonable care. The Court continued:
In addition to the clear rule of Stephens, other legal principles favor the
recognition of a requirement of due care in the circumstances present here. One is
the familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also assumes the
obligation of due care in performance of that duty. . ..
Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this case is the general
rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks
of harm to others. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, P.2d 135 (1980);
Halper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974).
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to
injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in
operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his
property as to avoid such injury. [Citations omitted.] The degree
of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the danger or
hazard connected Vv1th the activity. [Citations omitted.]
PVhitt v. Jarnagin, 91 JdallO 181, 188,418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966). \Vhether the
duty attaches is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the
risk.

Sharp v. WH Moore, 118 Idaho at 300,796 P.2d at 509.
The Court stated that foreseeability is a flexible concept that varIes with the
circumstances of each case. "Vlhere the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not
difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened
injury is minor, but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability
may be required." Id. (citing

u.s.

v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)

(Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Ca1.3d 112,211 Cal.Rptr. 356,
695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985)).
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This general duty of care was also discussed at length in Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,
179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008). In Boots, a child and his mother were bitten by a dog and they
asserted various causes of action against the landlord including premises liability which the court
said did not apply since the tenant's dog did not constitute a condition, but rather an activity, on
the premises. In addition, however, the plaintiffs asserted that the landlord had a general duty to
exercise ordinary care. In that regard, the Court of Appeals stated:
Our Supreme Court has suggested that premises liability is not the exclusive source of
duties where a landowner is involved. Instead, circumstances may give rise to a general
duty of care owed to third parties. As a general principle, every person, in the conduct of
his or her business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable,
foreseeable risks of harm to others.
ld. at 393, 179 P.3d at 356 (citing Shalp v. WH Moore, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509

(1990); and Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247-48, 985 P.2d 669,672-73 (1999»).
The Boots Court stated that in determining whether such a duty will arise in a particular
context, the Supreme Court has identified several factors. They include foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the Plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attaching
to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved. Boots, 147 Idaho at 394; 179 P.3d at 357 (citations omitted). The Court in Sharp
pointed out that the harm need not be specifically foreseeable. In Sharp, the harm that was
foreseeable if doors were left unlocked was theft of property, but the Court said that it is the
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general nature of the harm--criminal activity-that must be foreseeable, not the specific harm;
which in that case was rape. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301-02; 796 P.2d at 510-1I.
Analyzing the factors listed in Boots:
1\1

In this case where we have a second story apartment with a deck accessed from inside the
apartment by a door, it is foreseeable that a person, particularly a guest of a tenant who is
less familiar with the premises, may be harmed if the person falls from the deck.

•

There is no question in this case that Robinson suffered injury as a result of falling from
the deck, and there is a close connection between Marquardt's maintaining the deck
without a railing and Robinson's injuries which likely would not have occurred if a
railing had existed.

•

There is little burden to the Marquardt to install a railing around the deck, and in fact
Marquardt had expended money installing a new door during the year prior to Robinson's
fall.

•

There is a policy of preventing future harm and no real consequences to the community
of finding that Marquardt violated a general duty to exercise ordinary care under the
circumstances. We regularly encounter railings on stairs, or elevated platforms, in our
community. It is quite unusual for an elevated platform such as that on the Marquardt
home to lack protective railings.

Ordinary care-indeed, common sense-require a

protective railing around such a structure.
•

In addition, insurance is widely available for homeowners including those who
rent their premises, and in fact Marquardt maintained liability insurance on the
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premIses. That is not an issue for the fact finder, of course, but it is a factor for
the Court to consider according to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The Defendant asserted below that this general duty of reasonable care is inapplicable if a
specific duty has already been established. There may be some support for that in Rife v. Long,
127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143 (1996), in which the Court observed:
We only engage in a balancing of the harm in those rare situations when
we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or
when a duty has not previously been recognized.
Id. at 846. 908 P.2d at 148. However, this Court was clear in Sharp that "an additional reason"

for finding a duty of care to exist was the general rule that everyone has a duty of care to prevent
unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509.
Moreover, Robinson is asking this Court to recognize the applicability of Stephens to tenant's
guests or to extend the landlord's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to tenant's
guests.
The general duty to act reasonably under the circumstances is the principle armounced by
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Wilcox v. Hines more than a century ago, and relied on by this
Court in Stephens v. Stearns:
"The ground of liability upon the part of a landlord when he demises dangerous
property has nothing special to do with the relation of the landlord and tenant. It
is the ordinary case of liability for personal misfeasance. which runs through all
the relations of individuals to each other. "
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 257, 678 P.2d 41, 49 (quoting Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn.

538,46 S.W. 297, 299 (1898) (emphasis added».

C.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that Marquardt Did Not Breach a Duty to

Robinson.
The district court concluded that "there was no breach of a duty owed by Marquardt to
Robinson." It is important to note, however, that the district court did not identify a duty owed
by Marquardt to Robinson. The district court found that it was undisputed that Marquardt did
not warn Plaintiff about the lack of railings or place signs warning about the lack of a railing. R.
p. 97 (factual finding no. 11). The court acknowledged an issue of fact concerning whether
Winkelman warned Robinson, R. p. 98, but ruled that the disputed factual issue was immaterial
to the issues presented. Marquardt claims that only the tenant would have the duty to warn,
arguing that the tenant steps into the shoes of the landlord/o·wner. This argument, however,
overstates Harrison v. Taylor, the case Defendant relies on for this proposition.
In Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,768 P.2d 1321 (1989), this Court did away with the
open and obvious danger defense and reversed a summary judgment in favor of the business
tenant and business owner regarding a business patron's fall on a defective sidewalk. The Court
ruled:
[T]here is an additional basis for reversing the ruling of the trial court
here. Either a tenant, or a landlord. or both, may be liable to a third party for
injuries resulting from negligent repairs or failure to repair. Even in the absence
of a specific lease provision, and with no controlling statute requiring him to
make repairs, if a landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs he is bound to use
reasonable and ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. 49 AmJur.2d
§ 795, p. 746 (see cases cited therein). Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control
of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner,
and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the
premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to
keep the premises in repair.
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In this case the testimony was conflicting regarding whether Mr. Taylor
[owner] or the Struchens [tenant] had responsibility for maintenance of the
sidewalk. Mr. Struchen contended that Taylor was responsible under the oral
lease. Mr. Taylor testified that no maintenance agreement existed. Regarding
voluntary repairs, Mr. Struchen stated that on one occasion he repaired a sidewalk
hole different from the one Mrs. Harrison fell in. Taylor testified that there was
no clear cut procedure for repairs and sometimes he would do them and
sometimes Struchen would. These controverted issues of material fact, together
with conflicting testimony over whether the sidewalk was a common area for use
by all the business tenants of the building, demonstrate that the matter was not
ripe for summary judgment.
ld. at 596-97, 768 P.2d at 1329-1330 (citations and references to the record omitted) (emphasis

added).
In this case the Marquardt arguably had the duty to maintain and repair the premises, not
Winkelman. Marquardt's duty to repair and maintain the premises is evidenced by her actual
.te.lance and repair: replacing the door opening onto the deck ai issur

year prior to

Robinson's fall, and replacing the carpet in the apartment.
The very simple and cursory Lease and Rental Agreement between Marquardt and
Winkelman, R. p. 78, does not address who has the responsibility to maintain and repair the
premises. Accordingly, either Marquardt has that duty as the owner of the premises, or there is a
question of fact as to who has the duty to repair and maintain.
The trial erred in granting summary judgment, ruling, in essence, that Marquardt owed
Robinson no duty of care. Instead, the court should have denied summary judgment among
other reasons because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning who had a duty to repair
or maintain the premises and whether the premises were repaired or maintained negligently.
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V. CONCLUSION
The modern trend this Court joined in 1984 with Stephens v. Stearns was leaving behind
the antiquated cloak of landlord immunity for defects or dangerous conditions in leased premises
and holding landlords to an ordinary standard of reasonable care. Although Stephens v. Stearns
involved an injury to a tenant, many of the cases cited to and relied on by this Court involved
injuries to guests of tenants. Whether such guests might be classified as social guests or business
invitees was irrelevant because the analysis focused not on the status of the guests, but on the
nature of the landlord's duty given the elimination of the landlord's previous immunity. A duty
of reasonable care under the circll..lTI.stances, including the duty to prevent unreasonable,
foreseeable risks of harm to others, makes it irrelevant whether the person injured is tenant,
social guest, or business invitee.
Robinson urges the Court to recognize or extend this ordinary negligence standard of care
of landlords toward their tenants' guests. Public policy surely favors doing so as the alternative
is what the courts in Sargent v. Ross and Young v. Garwacki cautioned against:

landlord

immunity and its exceptions result in a disincentive to repair damaged or defective conditions on
the premises.
Moreover, this Court, in quoting Wilcox v. Hines, recognized that the landlord's duty is
not based on the landlord/tenant relationship so much as on "'the ordinary case of liability for
personal misfeasance, which runs through all the relations of individuals to each other. '"

Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49 (quoting Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W.
297, 299 (1898). This Court recognized that a landlord must act reasonably:
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"A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances
including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk."

Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388,308 A.2d
528,534 (1973).
Robinson thus respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of
summary judgment in Marquardt's favor.
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